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DEFENCE ESTIMATES

1983/84



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Canada 

MINISTER'S  
STATEMENT

# DEFENCE ESTIMATES

1983/84

HOUSE  
OF COMMONS  
STANDING  
COMMITTEE  
ON EXTERNAL  
AFFAIRS  
AND NATIONAL  
DEFENCE





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## INTRODUCTION

The consistent aim of Canadian security policy for more than three decades has been to contribute to the maintenance of world peace and, in particular, to the prevention of a war that would engulf Canada. We have achieved our aim by providing, in concert with our Allies, a believable and therefore effective deterrent to the threat of aggression which we have seen the Soviet Union and its allies as potentially raising against us. At the same time we have pursued with vigour and persistence the objective of arms control and disarmament arrangements which would produce equal or greater security for all while lowering reliance on military power, particularly nuclear power, for that purpose.

The vast majority of Canadians have accepted that Canada's defence policy has served Canada's security interests well and has provided a sound foundation for the pursuit of a wide range of other Canadian interests both at home and in the international arena. Without ignoring the importance to us of other members of the free world, in particular Japan, they recognize that the countries with which we are allied are collectively the countries with which we have the closest and longest-standing relationships. They are the countries with which we carry on the bulk of our trade; which Canadians visit most frequently and in the largest numbers; and with which we share our most prized political, social and cultural values. In short they are the countries with which, even though they include our principal commercial competitors, we share the greatest range of interests and conduct the most intensive and variegated relations.

Within this community members contribute according to agreed assessment of need and individual determination of capability. All derive a measure of security each could not enjoy alone. Canada has made important military commitments to its allies over the years and has received, in return, benefits of security far greater than we could have achieved by ourselves. The confidence which Canadians have developed in the collective strength of the North Atlantic Alliance and the security we have enjoyed over three decades have, however, brought with them problems of perception of our situation. There is a tendency to believe either that Canada and the values we cherish are not under physical threat or that Canada's part in the collective defence effort is such that the threat of attack on Canada would not change whether our defence effort were to double or be halved.

One of the features of Canada's geostrategic situation is that it is virtually impossible convincingly to demonstrate that Canada's national security against threats of military attack is diminished by reducing the size and capability of the Canadian Forces or is increased by increasing them. What can, however, be demonstrated is that reductions in the size and capability of the Canadian Forces do subtract from the military capabilities of the collective defence system which we have chosen to preserve our national security. Similarly it is demonstrable that increases in the size and capabilities of our forces do add to the military capabilities of that collective defence system. How much, in relation to the total capabilities of the Alliance, is unanswerable. The present size of the Canadian Forces is such that the military impact of any increases or reductions we might choose to make would, in the overall collective scheme of things, not be decisive. This is not to suggest that our military contributions to the collective capability are unimportant or that changes upwards or downwards in the level of our contributions would go unnoticed or be viewed as unimportant by our Allies and our potential adversaries. It is, rather, to suggest that what we gain for our national security from collective defence arrangements is more and, indeed substantially more, than what we contribute as a party to those arrangements.

As long as the principal threat to our security at home remains that of a nuclear attack on North America and as long as there remains no real defence against such an attack, we must seek our security in preventing such an attack from occurring. Until this can be assured by means of mutual arms control and disarmament arrangements we have no choice but to follow the route of deterrence of an attack. For that deterrence we participate in a significant way in the maintenance of the conventional military capabilities of the North Atlantic Alliance in Europe, where the threat of aggression against us has been successfully contained for a generation, and in the sea approaches to the North American continent.

We must, however, in the final analysis rely mainly upon the retaliatory capabilities of the strategic forces of the USA. For this reason, we have concentrated a substantial portion of our effort on assisting the USA in maintaining an adequate and credible retaliatory capability - the essence of deterrence. We do this by contributing to early warning of attack and by helping where we can to reduce the vulnerability to attack of the least protected elements of the US strategic retaliatory forces. Similarly we contribute to our own security by helping to ensure




that, until international negotiations achieve agreement which renders them unnecessary, those strategic retaliatory forces remain credible; that they are indeed capable of doing what they are advertised as being able to do. It is a logical outgrowth of our security situation, and in our security interest, that we also, within the limits of reasonable demand on our national resources, play a part in containing military confrontation in those parts of the world and in those sets of circumstances where hostilities carry a risk of escalation even to the point of precipitating a nuclear attack on North America.

We have concluded, judging that the international strategic outlook demands increases in the collective military capabilities of the North Atlantic Alliance, that we should consider further prudent enlargement of the size and capability of the Canadian Forces. Our approach has not been to add to the number of commitments but rather to increase our capacity to fulfil those we now have. The Government is engaged in the process of allocating increased real resources to our security and defence, and we are looking seriously at the proper and most productive relationship amongst the four requirements facing us. These are first, to fill out in manpower and material our present force posture; second, by means of timely programs of equipment replacement and modernization, to assure the continuing effectiveness of our existing military capabilities; third, through such measures as prepositioning in North Norway the heavy equipment of our land force earmarked for reinforcement of that area, to enhance the deterrent value of our commitment; and fourth, to enhance further the deterrent effectiveness of the forces by making prudent provision to increase their readiness for combat and their capacity to sustain combat operations in the event of hostilities.

Mindful and appreciative of the valuable contributions to public awareness and discussion of important defence questions made by recent studies by parliamentary committees, academic experts and other concerned groups, I am more than happy to respond to the expression of interest in and desire for information on a subject of fundamental importance to Canadians' security and well-being. In the pages that follow I set out in some detail and against the background of our current assessment of the world scene, what we are doing and what we propose to do.

15 March 1983



Hon. J. Gilles Lamontagne  
Minister of National Defence

## THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

It is obvious that Canada's interests are profoundly affected by the world around it. It is important, nevertheless, to remind ourselves of this from time to time for it is only from the international environment that military threats to Canada can arise. How we provide for our security must, therefore, take into account the nature of the global environment and how we think it will evolve.

As we look beyond our borders and peer forward into a hazy future, we see a complex environment marked by uncertainty and volatility, by unclear economic prospects for most nations, by unsatisfied aspirations and grim circumstances for many peoples, and by anxieties about the capacities of many of the international institutions on which we have relied for order in the world. This environment is also one of tense and strained interstate relations, clashing ambitions, and endemic conflict stemming from multiple causes. In such a setting, and in the absence of an effective mechanism for enforcing a universal rule of peaceful settlement, resolution of international problems through violence and warfare remains all too frequent, levels of armament tend to rise and modern arms to spread. In a world of many perils, the search for international peace without arms must rely, paradoxically, on the existence of military force adequate to discourage aggression. This appears likely to be true with respect to Canada and the western democracies for as long as they are confronted by a coalition of states led by a military superpower whose political system, ideological values, and rulers' perception of its strategic interests remain fundamentally antagonistic to our own.

While nothing can be anticipated with confidence, except the probability of surprise, the rest of the 1980s is likely to continue to be a period of difficult adjustment for the Western Community, for Canada as a member of that Community, and for the international system as a whole. In both the international and domestic context, security in the broadest sense will continue to be not only a function of basic military elements, but it will also be strongly influenced by economic and political factors. Comprehensive national security in the years ahead will call for a comprehensive national strategy.

Despite the inherent strength and resilience of Canada and its allies and friends, the western position in international affairs faces a number of challenges which will test the determination of the western community to

defend its basic interests, especially in regions critical to its continued well-being. In individual countries of the western world, problems will include:

- restoration of economic health and progress;
- threats to established institutions, in some cases hostile and violent;
- insecurity of supply of energy and raw materials;
- increased competition with other established industrialized trading powers, as well as with the emerging and dynamic developing countries;
- financial shocks associated with a fragile international monetary system; and
- demands for the maintenance of high levels both of social and of defence expenditures.

The Soviet leaders can be expected to continue to direct vast national resources into the further development and modernization of their already massive armed forces. They will do this whether, as they allege it is in response to the threat of encirclement, or, as their adversaries see it, to support their global strategic objectives, bolster their imperial power base, and justify claims to superpower status. But the net cost of Soviet military programs will grow as domestic productivity declines and the burden of imperial over-extension gets heavier. Soviet success in competing with the West will be conditioned by internal economic, social and political pressures and discontent within its empire. Faced with the lagging appeal of their official ideology and often fleeting political/economic influence in distant zones, the Soviet leaders will continue nevertheless to have available to them military means with which to exploit instability and seek political leverage in areas important to western security. Since they will continue to be unable to compete successfully with the West in ideological or economic terms, the Soviet rulers' temptations to use, or threaten the use of, military power to gain political advantage will persist. It will remain likely, however, that Soviet military force will not be applied directly so long as, and where, a western armed response would be the result. How to live in relative safety with the Soviet Union will, therefore, endure as a dominant concern in the West.



Within the North Atlantic Alliance, however, public anxieties about the possibilities of war waged with weapons of unprecedented destructive power and with unimaginable consequences will combine with severe economic strains to place increasing pressure on military budgets and to inhibit the modernization of allied defences. Public concerns will inevitably be exploited by Soviet propaganda and disinformation. It will remain the task of Alliance Governments to explain to their citizens both what nuclear deterrence is all about; why it is necessary to rely on it as the search for agreement on a better way to live in peace and security goes on; and how less reliance on nuclear weapons to keep the peace leads inexorably to substantially greater expenditure on other means to deter aggression.

The widespread aspiration to end the pouring of national treasure into weapons is in keeping with the highest traditions of western societies. Still the impulse to pacifism requires the balance of realistic recognition that arms control and disarmament, desirable as they may be, are not and cannot be ends in themselves. Security of their peoples in freedom will remain the first and greatest charge of western governments. They will, therefore, find themselves impelled to maintain both cohesion, which is the collective strength, and the imagination and clearheaded persistence to achieve arrangements with potential antagonists which provide equal security at lower levels of military effort. They will also need to give continuous attention to providing the arguments and explanations which will allow free people to make rational judgements on the course being followed.

Economic, social and political frustrations will persist in the "Third World". National rivalries will grow, and both internal and international tensions will, in some cases, have anti-western overtones. Although western military security will seldom be directly involved in Third World upheavals, the health of western societies and economies may be seriously affected. Dependence upon energy and raw materials furnished by a limited number of Third World suppliers is an obvious example of western vulnerability. Members of the western community, therefore, could be increasingly required to contemplate political, economic or even military measures to defend their essential interests.

For example, chronic instability in parts of the Third World has the potential to disrupt commercial activities important to Canadians. Europe and Japan, two of our principal trading partners, are heavily dependent on raw

materials supplied by countries of the developing world, in particular, those of the Middle East and Africa. Interruption of some of these supplies could have serious effects on the social and economic well-being of some of our allies and major trading partners with whose well-being our own is linked.

In Central America attempts to change political systems by insurgency and civil war, though the result of local conditions, harbour the potential for external intervention. While there is no immediate or direct threat to Canada in this situation, it is of serious concern to the United States and to some countries of the Caribbean basin with whom we have been establishing closer economic and political relations. The spread of fighting in that region could therefore have significant, if indirect, consequences for Canada.

To the west, Canada fronts on the Pacific Ocean and has important trade links with nations on its shores. It cannot ignore security issues in that immense area. Though there is an uneasy stability in the region as a whole, a festering war fuelled by Vietnam and supported by the Soviet Union continues in Indo China, as do antagonistic relations between the two Koreas, China and Vietnam, and China and the Soviet Union, all of which thwart the peaceful evolution of the region. Linked to these unsettling situations and to each other, are the dynamic elements inherent in the growth of Soviet military power and Soviet aspirations to increase its influence as a Pacific power, and to constrain American and Chinese influence, China's struggle to achieve modernity within an accepted sphere of influence, and redefinition of Japanese and American defence responsibilities. All these factors suggest a changing security environment at a time when economic developments stimulate Canadian interest in the Pacific Region and when US seapower in it has been weakened through re-deployment to the Indian Ocean.

In summary, current trends suggest that Canada, as one of the group of "Western Industrialized Democracies", will face a wide range of challenges in the 1980s. Among those bearing most heavily on Canadian security will be:

- the harmonization of western approaches in world economic, political and military affairs, including the balancing of political and economic relationships among the major power centres in Europe, the Pacific and North America;

- the influence of the growing military might of the Soviet Union;
- the persistent instability and unbalanced development in some "Third World" countries;
- the growing cost of national and collective security in light of competing demands for limited resources;
- the need to develop productive relationships with eastern Europe and the USSR, without undermining national and collective security in the process; and
- the choice of policies for development and maintenance of a sound Canadian industrial base as a lifeline to future national security and prosperity.

This is not an exhaustive list. It nevertheless serves to emphasize that Canadian security and its concomitant requirement for a responsive defence policy will be an issue of fundamental importance in the coming years.



## THE MILITARY BALANCE

In the years ahead one of the fundamental issues for defence policy, not only of Canada, but of the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole, will be how to maintain an approximate balance of forces between East and West. The objective will not be -- nor has it ever been -- to establish a dominant position. Rather it will be to heed the lessons of history that when armed antagonists face each other peace is best and most readily preserved by a balance of power.


### Nuclear Forces

While there is no single, fully satisfactory way of comparing the nuclear forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact -- the force structure, numbers of launchers and warheads, yield and accuracy are among the factors that go to make up the equation -- it is generally accepted that a rough parity exists at the strategic level between the United States and the Soviet Union. (See FIG 1) Both countries have continued to observe the provisions of the SALT I Interim Agreement and the initial limits on weapons set by the unratified SALT II Treaty. Major reductions and further limitations on these strategic systems are being sought in the current Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). Below the strategic level, however, the balance in nuclear weapons is distinctly unfavourable to NATO. (See FIG 2)

For two decades the Soviet Union has had the potential to threaten Western Europe with intermediate-range ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons, without there ever having been a large number of similar systems available in the allied military structure of NATO Europe. NATO was able to tolerate this situation as long as the United States enjoyed a superiority in intercontinental ballistic missiles which kept not only the Soviet Union's counterparts, but also its land-based Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) missiles facing Europe in rough balance. Since the Soviet Union has become equally strong in intercontinental weapons, and since this rough strategic parity has been codified by the SALT agreements, there is now a greater need to correct the pronounced imbalance in intermediate-range weapons, either through a reduction by the Soviet Union or by the installation of some offsetting system by the West.

FIG 1

# TOTAL STRATEGIC MISSILES AND BOMBERS



(a) USSR figures include Soviet strategic missiles and BEAR, BISON, and BACKFIRE bombers; the BACKFIRE bomber has been included in this figure because it has an inherent intercontinental capability although in its maritime and European land-attack rôles it poses a serious threat to NATO Europe.

(b) NATO figures include United States strategic missiles, 64 British strategic POLARIS SLBMs and United States B-52s and FB-111s. The United States-based FB-111 is included because it has a strategic mission.

Ref: "NATO and the WARSAW PACT - Force Comparisons" May 1982

FIGURE 1

FIG 2




## CURRENTLY DEPLOYED LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILE SYSTEMS

### NATO

None \*

### Warsaw Pact

(All missiles are  
located in the  
USSR with  
Soviet Forces)

	SS-4	SS-5	SS-20
			
Warheads	1	1	3 MIRV
Range (km)	2,000	4,100	4,400-5,000
Operational Mode	Fixed	Fixed	Mobile
Global Number Deployed*	275	25	300
Year Operational	Late 1950's	Early 1960's	1977

\* Excludes refire missiles

Ref: "NATO and the WARSAW PACT -  
Force Comparisons" May 1982

- \* In the absence of a concrete arms control agreement on longer-range INF missile systems, NATO plans to deploy in Western Europe up to 108 Pershing II missiles and up to 464 Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) commencing late 1983. The Pershing II is a mobile ballistic missile with one warhead with a range of 1800 km. The GLCM is a mobile missile with one warhead with a range of 2500 km.




In the area of intermediate-range weapons, the Soviet Union made a great and deliberate leap forward with the introduction of SS-20 missiles. The North Atlantic Alliance members were understandably concerned by this new threat to the territory of its European states. When early efforts to dissuade the Soviet Union from deploying its SS-20s failed, Western governments took the 'two-track' decision in December 1979 to modernize NATO's intermediate-range weapons through the introduction of the Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) and to offer arms control negotiations to the Soviet Union, an unprecedented procedure in which negotiations were proposed on new weapons systems before their deployment and whose objective it is to bring about a limitation of these systems in both East and West at the lowest possible level, desirably zero. Canada is convinced, as are her European allies, that the threat posed by the presence of the Soviet Union's long-range land-based INF missiles cannot be ignored. Though we greatly prefer to deal with this threat through negotiations, we also recognize and support the requirement for NATO to negotiate from a position of strength.

#### Conventional Land and Air Forces

Consideration of the state of conventional forces is a complex equation which cannot be determined only by counting numbers of men, tanks or aircraft. A full assessment must also take into account factors such as differences in aims, doctrine and philosophy, training and morale, quality of equipment and geographical advantages. As with nuclear forces in Europe, the Soviet Union claims that there is a rough parity in conventional forces between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. But all the evidence shows that in Europe, the area in which the security stakes are highest, there is a preponderance in favour of the Warsaw Pact, both in manpower and in most types of armament. (See FIG 3)

FIG 3

# NATO-WARSAW PACT FORCE COMPARISON (IN PLACE IN EUROPE)



Ref: "NATO and the WARSAW PACT - Force Comparisons" May 1982

- NOTES: 1. WARSAW PACT DIVISIONS NORMALLY CONSIST OF FEWER PERSONNEL THAN MANY NATO DIVISIONS BUT CONTAIN MORE TANKS AND ARTILLERY, THEREBY OBTAINING SIMILAR COMBAT POWER.  
2. FORCES IN PLACE IN NATO EUROPE, WARSAW PACT FORCES AS FAR EAST AS BUT EXCLUDING THE 3 WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS IN WESTERN RUSSIA (MOSCOW, VOLGA & URAL MILITARY DISTRICTS).

FIGURE 3

For nearly ten years the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, intended to reduce and limit conventional forces and thus stabilize the confrontation in Central Europe, have been frustrated because of the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to provide data on their forces. While there have been substantial improvements to NATO's land and air forces -- in Canada's case, for example, in tanks and personnel augmentation plans, artillery and wheeled vehicles -- these have not kept pace with the huge outlays of resources made by the Soviet Union over the past decade. In addition, apart from rectifying some deficiencies in defensive equipment, no attempt has been made by Allied Forces to counter the serious threat posed by the Soviet Union's massive offensive chemical warfare capability.

#### Naval Forces

As in other fields, simple numerical comparisons do not tell the whole story. They cannot, for example, reflect the different maritime requirements of the two alliances. Unlike the Warsaw Pact, NATO has a fundamental dependence on the sea lanes and shipping, requiring for their defence a substantial overall numerical superiority. NATO once had such an advantage, but this is no longer the case. (See FIG 4) The growth of Soviet naval forces over the past ten years has changed the balance of maritime power to the point where defence of the sea lines of communications of the West, a maritime task of immediate concern to Canada, would be extraordinarily difficult.



## NATO Naval Forces

NATO naval forces allocated to the Atlantic and European areas:

	<u>1971</u>	<u>1981</u>	
Aircraft carriers	9	7	
Helicopter carriers	6	2	
Cruisers	11	15	
Destroyers/frigates	381	274	
Coastal escorts and fast patrol boats	180	167	
Amphibious ships			
- Ocean-going	24	41	
- Independent coastal craft	62	69	
Mine Warfare Ships	349	257	
Total submarines	195	190	
- Ballistic missile submarines	38	35	
- Long-range attack submarines	72	60	
- Other types	85	95	
--% NATO submarines nuclear powered		50%	49%
Sea-based, tactical and support aircraft including helicopters	801	712	
Land-based tactical and support aircraft	112	180	
Land-based Anti-Submarine Warfare fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters	471	450	

## Warsaw Pact

Kiev class ships	0	2	
Helicopter carriers	2	2	
Cruisers	20	21	
Destroyers and frigates	142	182	
Coastal escorts and fast patrol boats	553	551	
Amphibious ships			
- Ocean-going	7	16	
- Independent coastal craft	190	155	
Mine Warfare Ships	374	360	
Total Submarines (All types)	248	258	
- Ballistic Missile submarines	38	52	
- Long-Range Attack submarines	115	149	
- Other types	95	57	
--% Submarines nuclear powered		32%	45%
Sea-based, tactical and support aircraft including helicopters	36	146	
Land-based tactical and support aircraft (including some transport aircraft and transport helicopters)	521(1)	719(1)	
Land-based Anti-Submarine Warfare fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters	225	179	

(1) About 300 of these are bombers.

FIGURE 4

REF: "NATO and the Warsaw Pact - Force Comparisons" May 82

### The Nuclear Threshold and "No First Use"

The destructive power of nuclear weapons and the grave risk of escalation to a strategic nuclear exchange which could result from the first use of nuclear weapons in Europe are persuasive arguments for keeping the nuclear threshold in Europe as high as possible. That can only be done by maintaining adequate conventional forces. NATO's commitment to the strengthening of its conventional forces was implicit when, in 1967 in adopting the strategy of 'flexible response', the Alliance moved away from its previous strategy of 'massive retaliation'. In adopting the present strategy NATO acknowledged that nuclear weapons could neither militarily nor politically make up for a lack of conventional forces and that 'defence on the cheap' was no longer possible. The requirement to provide a stronger conventional deterrent has been reaffirmed by NATO members many times since. Warsaw Pact conventional force improvements have, however, consistently surpassed those of NATO with the result that Alliance conventional capabilities today remain inadequate. The need to improve NATO's conventional forces and so diminish reliance on nuclear weapons has been recognized by Alliance members. The provision of an improved conventional capability for NATO not only would enhance deterrence and raise the nuclear threshold, it would also face the Warsaw Pact, if a conventional attack undertaken by those countries failed, with either having to be the first to use nuclear weapons or withdrawing their forces.

But this is not to suggest that in present circumstances the Alliance can adopt a "no first use" policy for its nuclear weapons. By improving its conventional capabilities NATO can reduce its dependence on nuclear weapons, and so make both the early first use of nuclear weapons and nuclear war less likely, but NATO cannot one-sidedly abolish all possibility of either. While the nuclear threshold can and should be raised, it would not be wise to remove the constraint which nuclear weapons impose on any kind of war in Europe. Deterrence in Europe continues to require that nuclear weapons remain an option available to the Alliance in extreme circumstances. A pledge of No First Use at this time would leave the Alliance with nothing with which to balance Warsaw Pact conventional advantages. Moreover, if only to prevent the risk of nuclear weapons being used against it, NATO must keep a nuclear counter-force in reserve.

## A Nuclear Freeze

It follows that one should examine with great caution proposals to freeze nuclear forces at existing levels. Rather, the two major nuclear powers should first negotiate substantial and verifiable reductions in their nuclear arsenals. An immediate global freeze would have the disadvantage of acting as a disincentive to current nuclear arms negotiations. This is particularly so with respect to the INF negotiations where a serious imbalance in forces exists, and where the Soviet Union only agreed to negotiate when it became apparent that NATO intended to remain firm in implementing the Alliance 'two-track' decision of December 1979. Further, developing an effective and verifiable mutual freeze between the United States and the Soviet Union would not be a simple matter. It would involve long and complicated negotiations. Both sides' time and energies are better spent pursuing agreements such as, START and INF, providing for significant, equitable and verifiable reductions.

Nor do we favour proposals that Europe or Canada declare themselves to be Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ). In Europe, where the Warsaw Pact has a marked superiority in conventional forces, such a measure could be destabilizing. Its implementation could raise the risk that military force would be used to achieve political aims. For Canada to declare itself to be a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone would be incompatible with our continued membership in NATO and NORAD.

## Deterrence and Defence

As long as nuclear weapons exist, there is no policy that can provide an absolute assurance that nuclear war will not occur. We do not have the luxury of choosing a policy wholly untainted by the nuclear danger. We can only choose between policies that entail different degrees of risk. We and our allies have chosen deterrence.

Deterrence is not an attractive way of ensuring peace, but it has worked. For it to work, NATO must possess the means to respond to aggression, both conventional and nuclear. The maintenance of a credible deterrent has helped to make Western Europe strong and to keep the peace between East and West for over thirty years, despite circumstances that were often difficult. It is hard to think of any other period in European history where such deep political divisions and so many potential flash-points would not have led to war. That deterrent posture of the West still keeps



the peace today. Deterrence also provides the necessary stability to enable us to pursue arms control measures which will really give us a safer world if they are verifiable and apply equally to both sides. The possession of nuclear weapons is an essential fact of deterrence: in a world where such weapons exist the North Atlantic Alliance must be able to deter their use by an enemy or to resist blackmail based on the threat of nuclear attack.

But that is not the end of it. No one can rest comfortably on such a policy alone as the basis of international peace for the rest of time. That is why we have to search unrelentingly for better ways of ensuring a stable world. Vital among these is the Government's commitment to pursue effective measures of arms control and disarmament. But in the meantime, for deterrence to remain effective, Canada and other NATO nations must from time to time modernize their defence equipment as existing systems become obsolete.

#### Detente and Arms Control

Arms build-up alone is not enough to provide certainty that a military balance will remain stable and reliable in the long term. Lasting security requires that the attempt be made to create a stable military equilibrium at the lowest possible level by means of balanced limitations of military potentials. Such agreements must take into account the military efforts of the other side, especially existing imbalances in the ratio of military force, and provide for unreduced security in terms of defence capability at every stage of the process. Arms control and disarmament measures are not substitutes for security and stability achieved by military means, but must be designed to enhance those ends.

In pursuit of security and stability at lower levels of military effort Canada plays a full role in the work of the United Nations and the Committee on Disarmament. An easing of tension between East and West is a main goal of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in which work Canada also participates. As a member of NATO we also take part as well in Alliance consultations on the bilateral START and INF nuclear arms negotiations, and we participate directly in the MBFR negotiations. In short, we continue to believe that our current approach of attempting to maintain a stable military balance coupled with active pursuit of negotiations to reduce the levels of both nuclear and conventional forces offers the best prospects for peace now and for the foreseeable future.

## THE SIZE AND SHAPE OF THE CANADIAN FORCES

The international environment in which we find ourselves and the military balance of which we are a part, have a direct bearing on the size and shape of the Canadian Forces. It is perhaps helpful to approach the question of these dimensions of our military capability by looking first at the roles of the Canadian Forces, then at the levels of forces needed to perform those roles and, finally, at the operational capabilities or types of the forces needed to meet national and international commitments.

### The Roles

The strategic purposes of Canada's forces have not changed in the past 30 years, nor are they likely to change in the foreseeable future. Those purposes have in the post-war years been expressed as roles. Their detailed application has, of course, adapted to changing circumstances but, at the same time, has remained tied to the notion of forces able to provide for:

- the protection of Canada and Canadian national interests at home and abroad; this includes the provision of aid to the civil power, and national development;
- co-operation with the United States in the defence of North America;
- a contribution, with our allies, to the security of the North Atlantic Treaty area; and
- international peacekeeping.

### The Levels of Forces

Over the years the examination of the considerations which lead to emphasis on one type of force or another has been a continuous process of adjustment to meet changing perceptions of the threat in a dynamic world situation. Inputs of intelligence, strategic considerations, alliance and national concerns, lead to the formulation of planning guidance and to the development of a framework within which various options for force development are articulated and from which choices are made.

In recent years, the process of review has led to the conclusion, both in Canada and amongst our allies, that the idea that only "forces in being" -- that is, forces in place and immediately ready for combat at the outset of hostilities -- were useful as a deterrent to aggression or to provide the necessary defence in the event of a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is no longer appropriate or adequate in the strategic circumstances of the 1980s. In conditions of nuclear parity, nuclear weapons are less certain a deterrent to aggression by conventional forces. War, if it did occur, might less certainly end quickly in negotiations or a nuclear spasm. The nuclear threshold needs to be raised and the conventional leg of the deterrent triad improved and strengthened.

In these circumstances our forces must be improved in terms of sustainability - that is, in terms of our capacity to reinforce them, to provide supplies and to keep them up to strength in battle. This will, over time, have a considerable effect on force structure, leading to a new emphasis on a "total force" concept. The "total force" includes the Regular Force and all sub-components of the Reserve Force. It is recognized that the Regular Force on full-time service in peacetime could, in an emergency, undertake only limited tasks for a relatively short time without augmentation. Any wartime commitment of significant size or duration would require additional personnel from the Reserves.

The Canadian Forces are, therefore, developing the necessary plans and preparations which would enable them, in a sustained crisis, to carry out whatever expansion the government of the day could reasonably demand. Although we do not envisage the type of national mobilization which occurred in the two World Wars, these plans and preparations will enable the Canadian Forces in a crisis immediately to activate its full war establishment, made up of both its Regular Force, and of substantially improved Reserve components, supported by greatly expanded recruiting. It is this type of mobilization plan which is being prepared to ensure that Canada's forces will be able to meet and sustain their defence commitments in the 1980s.

#### Types of Forces

Another partial answer to the challenges of the 80s is to be found in types of regular and reserve forces that are assigned to particular tasks. Defence capability requirements are best built on the most critical and demanding of the tasks assigned to the Forces. The



capability to meet a critical and demanding task, such as the protection of shipping in the hostile environment of the North Atlantic inherently provides the means to carry out numerous less demanding tasks such as marine rescue and fisheries patrols. To give a better understanding of the implications of the more critical tasks for the capabilities of the Canadian Forces, it may help to briefly review those tasks or broad missions which underlie the design of our force structure.

#### Canada's Forces in Europe


Our forces stationed in Europe are the most visible international demonstration of our participation in the collective defence arrangements of NATO. They include an army formation, an air force formation and a national headquarters and support capability.

In war, these forces would be involved in high intensity conflict against an enemy employing the most modern and sophisticated equipment. The army formation, 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (4 CMBG), and the air force formation, 1 Canadian Air Group (1 CAG), must match that sophistication if they are to fight effectively in their respective roles as the NATO Central Army Groups' in-theatre reserve, and as part of the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force.

Since 1975 steady progress has been made in updating these forces, re-equipping them with modern equipment. In recent years 4 CMBG has been re-equipped with Leopard tanks. New protective chemical warfare clothing is being acquired for both the soldiers of 4 CMBG and the ground and aircrew of 1 CAG. New two and a half ton wheeled cargo vehicles are being built in Canada now and will enter service soon with Canadian Forces Europe. Starting in 1985 we will be introducing the CF 18 into 1 CAG.

The requirement to exercise national command and provide the appropriate support to our forces overseas, as well as the growing importance of being able to sustain such forces in conventional combat, places significant strain on our infrastructure in Europe. The Department of National Defence will therefore be examining this infrastructure and will take action to improve its capability to receive reinforcements and to sustain all the Canadian forces that may be assigned to the European theatre.

MAP 1. - CANADA'S FORCES IN EUROPE



General Purpose Maritime Forces

As the recent hostilities in the Falklands have shown, maritime power can be very important. The navy and the associated maritime air forces are structured mainly to defend, along with our US and NATO allies, the ocean approaches to North America and the reinforcement and resupply routes across the Atlantic to Europe. They also have the responsibility in ocean areas assigned to Canada to detect submarines threatening North America with ballistic or cruise missiles. Given the capabilities required to do these jobs, the navy is able to perform many other less demanding tasks which are, nevertheless, very important to safeguard our extensive maritime interests. These include the protection of Canadian territorial waters, rights and interests against foreign challenges, the provision of help to other government departments and agencies in enforcing Canadian laws and regulations, and in helping aviators and mariners in distress. Ships designed for more demanding missions also enable the navy to contribute to peacekeeping operations.

Over the past decade we have had to defer modernization of the surface fleet to allow for other major defence procurement programs. As a result, although the fleet is well maintained, much of its equipment is growing old. In particular, the survivability of our steam destroyers would be strained in a hostile multi-threat environment. We have on the other hand, made a major improvement in the capability of our maritime air forces by introducing the Aurora long-range patrol aircraft. There are, as well, several other major programs underway to improve our maritime effectiveness. The two most important of these are the Canadian Patrol Frigate project and the modernization of the four Tribal Class destroyers which together promise to further enhance the combat capability of the fleet towards the end of this decade. In the meantime, the destroyer life extension program which is already well advanced, will enable the navy to continue to get the job done until the ship replacement program comes to fruition. Thereafter, a steady improvement in the operational effectiveness of the maritime forces is expected through the 1990s, as the planned replacement and modernization programs provide new ships and the necessary modern combat equipment.

FIG. 5 - GENERAL PURPOSE MARITIME FORCES






## General Purpose Land Forces

The army in Canada, and the associated tactical helicopter squadrons, will be particularly affected by the increasing need for effective conventional forces to contribute to NATO's strategy of deterrence at all levels of conflict.

The army in Canada is designed primarily to cope with its most difficult mission, that of providing, in an emergency, additional land forces for the defence of Europe in accordance with our NATO commitments. It must also, of course, have the capability to defend against direct attack on North America, a capability which would have to be provided in large part by Reserves. The units designed for these difficult jobs are able to carry out the equally important but militarily less difficult tasks of international peacekeeping, helping civilian authorities to exercise their responsibilities in relation to the sovereignty and security of Canada's territory, assisting them in the event of an emergency or disaster, and contributing to national development.

FIG. 6 - GENERAL PURPOSE LAND FORCES IN CANADA



Modernization and improvement of the sustainability of the army in Canada will also take into account the need to reinforce rapidly and subsequently sustain our principal military commitments in Europe. In an emergency it will be necessary:

- to provide enough personnel to bring our brigade in Germany quickly up to its full fighting strength; and
- to provide a brigade-size force for the defence of North Norway, known as the "Canadian Air and Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade Group".

For all these purposes, in Canada and in Europe, a reasonably balanced equipment program for two of the brigades - 4 CMBG and the CAST Brigade - is planned. Land forces for the defence of Canada, consisting largely of Reserves structured around the Regular Force nucleus of two battle groups and the centrally based 900 man Canadian Airborne Regiment, will hold equipment such as: tactical radios, the new armoured vehicle fleet, and various types of artillery pieces. They will also benefit from the replacement of the present wheeled vehicles fleet of jeeps, 5 quarter, two and a half, and 5 ton vehicles, as well as from the acquisition of the new family of small arms when that occurs.

The equipment which we propose to purchase for the CAST Brigade will be distributed mainly among the Regular Force Units which make up that Brigade; some will, however, be prepositioned in northern Europe, and some will, in peacetime be used by training schools and the Militia. Much of this equipment will either be manufactured or assembled in Canada with the highest achievable Canadian content.


While all elements of the Canadian Forces are able to contribute to peacekeeping operations, a very large part of our capability to respond to UN requests for such help is found within the army in Canada. Our service personnel continue to serve in the following significant UN missions, shown on Map I.

- United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) where 20 Canadian military personnel are deployed with other nationals in Israel and surrounding countries.

- United Nations Disengagement Force (UNDOF) where approximately 220 logistics, signals and observer personnel serve in a multi-national contingent. This contingent is supported by regular CF strategic airlift.
- United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) where a combat arms unit of approximately 550 personnel serves as part of a multi-national contingent which maintains the security of the border area between the Greek and Turk Cypriots. The Canadian contingent is rotated every six months and resupplied weekly by CF strategic airlift.

The Canadian Forces will continue to maintain one infantry battalion and supporting elements on standby for these and such other peacekeeping operations as may be undertaken by the Government.

MAP. 2 - CANADIAN FORCES PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS




## The Air Forces in Canada

A large part of the Canadian air forces' resources are conceptually and operationally associated with the missions of maritime or land forces or with general support. Therefore only the tactical fighter and air defence forces are addressed here.

The tactical fighter and air defence forces in Canada are designed to carry out two missions. They must provide rapid reinforcement of our defences in Europe in support of our NATO agreements. They must also, with our US allies give unambiguous warning of and, if necessary, defend against aerospace attack on North America.

FIG. 7 - AIR FORCES IN CANADA





Canada has undertaken to provide in a crisis two rapid reactor tactical air squadrons to help bolster the defence of the NATO Northern Flank. These squadrons, normally based in Canada, will provide air defence and close air support in Canada should they not be required in Europe. They are currently equipped with the relatively short-ranged CF-5, but their capability will be improved significantly in the late 1980s when the CF-5 will be replaced by the CF-18.

The aerospace surveillance and defence of North America requires, at a high degree of readiness, an air defence system capable of dissuading Soviet development and employment of an air breathing bomber capability for an effective attack on North American strategic retaliatory forces, key communications facilities and industrial capability which are so important to the deterrent posture of the Alliance.

The present North American air defence system is composed of elements, such as the CADIN/PINETREE radars, designed and installed during the 1950's and early 60's to counter the bomber threat of the 1950's. In addition to being in an advanced state of obsolescence the system has deficiencies which make it incapable of adequately fulfilling the roles of an air defence system in the 1980's and of meeting the developing and future threats which will begin to appear later in this decade and in the next. Therefore, measures are being developed jointly by Canada and the United States which will ensure that the air defence system in North America will remain effective, and therefore credible, to the year 2000 and beyond. Among steps already being taken for modernization are two new Region Operation Control Centres being installed in North Bay to replace the aging Semi Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system, and replacement of the CF-101 Voodoo by the CF-18, one of the finest interceptors available today.

#### SUPPORT CAPABILITIES

Though it is the operational mission which forms the basis for the design of each of the "fighting" elements of the Canadian Forces, these forces, in turn, require a wide range of support without which they could neither carry out their missions nor indeed even maintain themselves in peacetime.

## Air Transport

The vast size of our country and the dispersed nature of our overseas commitments makes it important that we have an effective strategic and tactical air transport capability. Its "raison d'etre" includes the deployment of land forces within North America, the reinforcement and resupply of forces deployed in Europe, the delivery of augmentation forces, and general logistics support. In peacetime, the military air transport system can also be used to move servicemen and military cargo, and to assist other Government departments in such things as international relief flights or the evacuation of Canadian nationals from foreign countries during times of tension or emergency.

However, military airlift is insufficient to meet, alone, the total need. The rapid delivery of Canada's forces to both Central and Northern Europe and the subsequent sustainment of them in the event of war, will require the combined effort of Canada's military and civil air capacity. Plans to integrate Canada's total transport capacity in the event of emergency or war are being developed in co-operation with other Government departments, agencies and national air carriers. In this way we will seek to maximize the "surge" capability of our national air transport resources while maintaining at a prudent but restrained level the military air transport capability necessary for a rapid response and for the airlift of equipment and forces which commercial pattern aircraft could not handle.

## Search and Rescue

The National Search and Rescue (SAR) program is a coordinated one involving a number of federal departments and other agencies as well as hundreds of private citizens across the country. The Minister of National Defence has been designated the "lead minister" and the Department of National Defence is steadily improving its capabilities to coordinate the reaction required in the event of air or maritime distress incidents as well as its capability to react to air incidents. A major improvement now in progress is the upgrading of rescue helicopters to give them greater range and significantly improve their ability to operate in bad weather at any time, day or night. Another development is Canadian participation in the search and rescue (SARSAT/COSPAS) satellite project which currently involves the resources and cooperation of Canada, USA, USSR and France. This international system, although still in the evaluation phase, is demonstrating almost daily the ability of a

satellite system to reduce the time required to detect and locate an emergency beacon transmitting from an aircraft or vessel in distress.

At four Rescue Coordination Centres located at Halifax, N.S., Trenton, Ont., Edmonton, Alta. and Victoria, B.C., SAR Region Commanders have at their disposal a wide range of resources. From five locations distributed geographically across Canada, DND fixed and rotary wing aircraft and dedicated SAR vessels of the Canadian Coast Guard are on call 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The Department of Fisheries and Oceans respond with equal promptness from locations on both coasts, on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River. In addition, Canada and the USA have cooperative arrangements whereby the SAR resources of each country can be called upon by the other in the event of incidents near the Canada/US border. These arrangements will continue as will others under which other government resources, civil volunteer agencies and individuals across the country can be called upon.

#### Command, Control and Communication (C<sup>3</sup>)

For the command and control of our widespread forces, there is need both for staff and for communications. There is a national headquarters from which the Minister, the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Deputy Minister exercise their respective responsibilities for the management of the Department of National Defence and the command and control of the Canadian Forces. A recently modernized communication network provides for strategic command and control, tying together the various establishments of the Canadian Forces. This system also provides support for emergency government operations in Canada, and would back-up the emergency government radio system were the necessity to arise. For functional and regional control of the operations of the Canadian Forces there are headquarters at: Victoria, for Maritime Command and the Pacific Region; at Winnipeg, for Air Command and the Prairie Region; at St Hubert, for Mobile Command and the Eastern Region; at Halifax, for Maritime Command and the Atlantic Region; at Trenton, for Training Systems and the Central Region; and at Lahr, for Canadian Forces Europe.

#### Personnel

Personnel support is also a vital function. The most valuable resource of the Canadian Forces is "people", both in its military and civilian components. To be effective, the Regular and Reserve forces require services for

personnel development (recruiting, individual training and education), personnel management (administration, career assignment, spiritual and morale) and health services (medical and dental). Military service requires courage and self-denial, physical stamina, special skills and special knowledge. The challenge in the field of "personnel" is to prepare young Canadians to be sailors, soldiers and airmen with the qualities required of military service, while at the same time fulfilling their needs as individuals. An additional challenge during the years ahead will be to meet the relatively constant requirements of the peacetime forces, while at the same time developing the mechanisms for a rapid transition to the much larger strengths which would be required to meet and sustain Canada's commitments during a crisis.

### Materiel

The provision of combat-ready operational forces also requires a high degree of materiel support, including logistics (supply, transportation equipment, engineering and maintenance), research and development and base facilities.

The greatest challenge, in this area, is to provide for the sustainment of our forces during a period of combat. We will need to acquire and maintain necessary levels of combat supplies, such as fuel and ammunition, and other materiel. We will also have to acquire supply management and transportation systems sufficient to ensure that these items are available when and where required.



# THE DEFENCE SERVICES PROGRAM

Of all the challenges evident in ensuring that the Canadian Forces are appropriately organized and equipped to accomplish the tasks assigned to them, the most difficult is that of keeping all measures taken or proposed within the realm of affordability. The discipline of the Government's policy and expenditure management system not only ensures thoroughly justified requests for DND funding, but also requires that the funds allocated to DND are carefully managed to meet the Government's objectives.

The Government has made a constant effort to meet the NATO goal of three percent real growth in defence budgets since this objective was adopted by the Allies in 1977. The projections for 1983/84 and 1984/85 reflect continued growth of the defence envelope of about 3% after inflation is taken into account.

In addition to this three percent real growth in funding, it can be seen at FIG 8 that an amount equal to .25% of the Defence budget has been identified, beginning in 1984/85, specifically for increased readiness and sustainability. It is proposed that this amount should grow in subsequent years, at a rate of .25% per year to a maximum of 2% of the Defence budget, thus providing for the gradual improvement of our level of preparedness.


FIGURE 8

## FUNDING

	<u>83/84</u>	<u>SBY(M)</u>	<u>84/85</u>
	(Estimated)		(Projected)
Personnel	3,187		3,361
O & M	2,075		2,343
Grants and Contributions	164		178
Readiness and Sustainability	-		20
Capital	1,815		2,224
Sub-Total	7,241		8,126
Statutories	599		644
Total Envelope	7,840		8,770


The distribution of defence funds has, as shown in Fig. 9, changed over the past years because of the need to devote an increased share of the budget to re-equipping the forces. In percentage terms, this increase has been at the expense of personnel costs, although some growth in force levels has been possible. As can be seen, operations and maintenance expenditures have been held relatively constant over the same period, despite the increased costs of maintaining the older equipments. Grants and Contributions, which include our NATO contributions, have also been relatively constant over the period, increasing somewhat in the late 1970's to reflect our participation in the NATO airborne early warning (AEW) program.

FIGURE 9



Capital. In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the level of our defence budgets did not allow for much spending on new equipment. As Fig. 10 shows, in 1972/73 capital fell to as low as 8% of the Defence Services Program. However, in 1974, it was decided to substantially re-equip the forces and to this end provision has been made since then for significant real growth in equipment spending annually between 77/78 and the present.


FIGURE 10



Personnel. In 1977, when it became evident that the Canadian forces' mission could not be accomplished with a strength just over 79,000, the government approved a gradual increase of 4,707 military person-years to achieve a Regular Force strength of 83,861. Since 1978/79, annual increases of 400 military person-years have been made toward this goal and these increases are planned to continue through 1983/84. (See FIG 11) At the same time our civilian person-year level has been reduced slightly.

FIGURE 11 - Personnel

**MILITARY STRENGTH 1965-1985**






The 1983/84 Estimates

In summary, the Defence Services Program for 1983/84 continues the orientation of recent years toward increased capital procurement for renewal of equipment. The long term objective is a realistic balance among the principle elements of capital, personnel and operations and maintenance which will produce a cost effective capability to meet Canada's national and collective defence requirements.

Figure 12 shows how our funds will be allotted in the coming year.

FIGURE 12

**PERCENTAGE ALLOCATIONS TO COMPONENTS OF  
THE DEFENCE SERVICES PROGRAM ....  
FY 83/84**



DDDS 83012877V

### THE WAY AHEAD

Progress along the course charted by the Government in 1971 has been as constant as the currents and shoals of international affairs have allowed. The pace of strengthening our capacity to play our proper role in the collective arrangements which continue to preserve our security and to maintain the peace has been as rapid as the myriad considerations related to allocation and expenditure of significant resources have allowed. We are moving steadily forward in the modernization and replacement of our defence equipment and are launched on a program to ensure the readiness and sustainability of our forces. The essential place of reserve forces in the scheme of things is well recognized and concrete measures are being adopted to enhance their role.

The task of improving our ability to contribute to collective security will never end. We do not live in a static world. The effectiveness of our forces is measurable only in relation to the forces with which they might be engaged. The credibility of our forces' contribution to the deterrence of aggression and the avoidance of risks depends heavily on their being able to do their job at any time they might be required to do it. So we will continue to take those steps which are necessary and are timely. We will meet our obligations, not only to our allies but, of even greater importance to the people of Canada whose security is a fundamental and inescapable responsibility of government.

This will be done within a defence policy which has proved to be right for Canada for more than a decade - a defence policy which recognizes the importance of balancing the imperative of strength with the need for international arrangements which will reduce reliance on force in the conduct of nations' affairs. In implementing that policy the Government will continue to allocate the resources that Canada's security requires - and no more. There is an equal determination that the resources devoted to defence, resources for which there are myriad other calls, will be put to the best possible use in the interests of effective defence and the good of the country as a whole.























